

OUTGOING TELEGRAM UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CROSSHATCH

INITIAL HERE 5.1

AUTH _____ DRAFT KA
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PQ5A

AF/C:KAISTON:KCA
07/15/94 647-3139 SECC 4533
P:PTARNOFF

RELEASED IN FULL

AF:GEMOOSE P:ESWICKER IO/PHO:JWOOD PM/ISP:RUHARTON
EUR/RPM:EADLER AF/S:SKEOUGH-FISH EUR/WE:ACARSON NEA/IAI:RROTH
JCS:CROBERTSON OSD:VKERN NSC:
S/S-0: S/S:

IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE, ROME IMMEDIATE, BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE,
BONN IMMEDIATE, MOSCOW IMMEDIATE, PARIS IMMEDIATE +
PRIORITY BUJUMBURA, DAR ES SALAAM, KINSHASA, KAMPALA,
NAIROBI, DAKAR, ACCRA, LUSAKA, HARARE, TUNIS, ADDIS ABABA +

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PHUM, MARR, UNSC, RW

SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP ON SUPPORT FOR EXPANDED UNAMIR

REF: A) STATE 177616 B) STATE 188264
C) USEU BRUSSELS 7624

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.

3. AS OUTLINED IN REF (A), OUR KEY OBJECTIVE REMAINS
SEEING THAT EXPANDED UNAMIR IS DEPLOYED IN RWANDA AS
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO PERMIT UNAMIR TO CARRY OUT ITS
MANDATE AND TO REPLACE THE TEMPORARY FRENCH DEPLOYMENT.
WE HAVE RECEIVED GENERAL STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR OUR
CONCEPT TO HAVE DONOR COUNTRIES "ADOPT" A BATTALION AND
RECOGNITION OF THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF FAST ACTION (REF
C); HOWEVER, SO FAR, SUPPORT TO HELP THE UN EQUIP AND MOVE
POTENTIAL UNAMIR BATTALIONS TO RWANDA HAS BEEN LESS THAN
ADEQUATE.

4. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE MOST RAPID POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT
OF EXPANDED UNAMIR, WE NEED TO FOCUS ON COUNTRIES THAT ARE

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN L MILLS
DATE/CASE ID: 27 AUG 2007 200103014

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LIKELY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE. WHERE APPROPRIATE, WE SHOULD RECOMMEND CONTINGENTS THAT LIKELY DONOR COUNTRIES SHOULD CONSIDER ADOPTING, OR AT LEAST SERVING AS ONE OF THE CONTINGENT'S "CORNERSTONE" EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS. DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT ACTION ADDRESSEES' HOST COUNTRIES ARE EITHER SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING ASSISTANCE TO UNAMIR OR ARE IN A POSITION TO DO SO. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS TO URGE THEM TO JOIN THE U.S. IN AN ALL OUT EFFORT TO GET UNAMIR CONTINGENTS EQUIPPED AND DEPLOYED. THE DEMARCHE SHOULD BE MADE BY THE AMBASSADOR OR COM TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER OR EQUIVALENT, WHO SHOULD BE INFORMED THAT THIS IS A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM ACTING SECRETARY TALBOTT. POSTS SHOULD DRAW ON REF {A} AND USE THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC TALKING POINTS PROVIDED BELOW.

5. POINTS FOR ALL ACTION ADDRESSEES EXCEPT PARIS AND PRETORIA:

-- OUR KEY OBJECTIVE IS TO SEE THAT EXPANDED UNAMIR IS DEPLOYED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE SO THAT THE UN FORCE CAN REPLACE THE TEMPORARY FRENCH OPERATION AND TAKE UP ITS MISSION OF PROVIDING PROTECTION TO THREATENED POPULATIONS AND FACILITATING RELIEF EFFORTS.

-- TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST ASSIST UNAMIR TROOP CONTRIBUTORS WITH THEIR DEPLOYMENT, IN PARTICULAR THROUGH PROVIDING MISSION-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT TO UNAMIR.

-- WE HAVE ALREADY LEASED AND DELIVERED 50 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APC'S) TO UNAMIR. WE ARE NOW WORKING WITH THE UN TO MEET ADDITIONAL MISSION-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF THE GHANAIAN CONTINGENT.

-- HELPING TO EQUIP UNAMIR REQUIRES HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL COMMITMENT AND CONTINUOUS CLOSE WORKING LEVEL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UN, TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, AND COUNTRIES WILLING TO OFFER LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

-- THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS TAKES TIME, AND IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT COMMITMENTS BE QUICKLY FORTHCOMING AND CLOSELY FOLLOWED AND PUSHED THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS.

-- WE KNOW YOU SHARE OUR DESIRE TO SEE UNAMIR DEPLOYED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. WE BELIEVE YOU CAN PLAY A KEY ROLE IN REACHING THIS GOAL THROUGH JOINING THE U.S. IN PROVIDING MISSION-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT TO PARTICULAR UNAMIR CONTINGENTS.

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-- WE URGE YOU TO ENGAGE ALL RELEVANT ELEMENTS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT IN DISCUSSIONS ON THIS CRUCIAL ISSUE TO DETERMINE WHAT SUPPORT YOU COULD PROVIDE AND WITHIN WHAT TIME-FRAME, AND TO COMMUNICATE YOUR DECISION TO THE UN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. ADDITIONAL POINT FOR MOSCOW:

-- WE HOPE THAT YOU CAN PROVIDE MISSION-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT FOR ONE UNAMIR CONTINGENT, AS THE U.S. HAS DONE FOR GHANA. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ETHIOPIANS, ZIMBABWEANS, AND ZAMBIANS ALREADY HAVE SIGNIFICANT SUPPLIES OF RUSSIAN EQUIPMENT. FOR THIS REASON, YOU MAY WISH TO FOCUS ON THE EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF ONE OF THESE CONTINGENTS.

7. ADDITIONAL POINT FOR BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, ROME, BONN, KIEV, AND TEL AVIV {FOR KIEV AND TEL AVIV: WE ARE REPEATING REF {A} FOR YOUR BACKGROUND. YOU MAY WISH TO DRAW ON POINTS IN REF {A} AS PART OF YOUR DEMARCHE}:

-- WE URGE YOU TO IDENTIFY ONE CONTINGENT ON WHICH YOU COULD FOCUS YOUR ASSISTANCE, WHICH COULD SERVE AS THE CORNERSTONE TO A LARGER EFFORT TO MEET THAT CONTINGENT'S NEEDS. YOU COULD THEN APPROACH OTHER WILLING DONORS TO SEEK THEIR ASSISTANCE IN MEETING THE REMAINING NEEDS OF THE CONTINGENT.

{FOR BRUSSELS}: -- WE KNOW YOU LEFT EQUIPMENT IN RWANDA FOR UNAMIR'S USE AFTER YOUR WITHDRAWAL, WHICH WAS A WELCOME CONTRIBUTION. GIVEN YOUR SPECIAL TIES TO RWANDA, WE HOPE YOU CAN PROVIDE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT. WE UNDERSTAND THE TUNISIANS MAY BE ONE OF THE FIRST CONTINGENTS READY TO DEPLOY. YOU MAY WISH TO FOCUS YOUR EFFORTS ON THEM, BRINGING ALONG ONE OR MORE OF YOUR EU ALLIES TO HANDLE THE BALANCE OF THE TUNISIANS' NEEDS.

{FOR TEL AVIV}: -- YOU MAY WISH TO FOCUS YOUR EFFORTS ON THE ETHIOPIAN CONTINGENT, GIVEN YOUR COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH ETHIOPIA.

8. ADDITIONAL POINT FOR OTTAWA:

-- WE WELCOME YOUR WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE A COMMUNICATIONS CONTINGENT TO UNAMIR. WE KNOW HOW COMMITTED YOU ARE TO THE SUCCESS OF THIS OPERATION AND HOPE YOU COULD MAKE MISSION-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE

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TO THE UN AND/OR ONE OF THE COMMONWEALTH AFRICAN
CONTINGENTS.

9. FOR PRETORIA: WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE SAG IS NOT
INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE "ADOPT A BATTALION" PROPOSAL.
POST SHOULD FIRM UP SOUTH AFRICA'S PRE-EXISTING COMMITMENT
TO RWANDA, USING THE FOLLOWING POINT:

-- WE VALUE SOUTH AFRICA'S QUICK ENGAGEMENT IN SEVERAL
DIFFERENT INITIATIVES ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT, INCLUDING
IN PARTICULAR YOUR DECISION TO PROVIDE APC'S AND
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR THE RWANDAN CRISIS. WE
BELIEVE SOUTH AFRICAN APC'S ARE PARTICULARLY SUITED TO
UNAMIR'S NEEDS. WE ENCOURAGE RAPID CLOSING OF THE APC
DEAL WITH THE UN AND ACCELERATION OF RELIEF AID, GIVEN THE
UNPRECEDENTED HUMANITARIAN CRISIS NOW FACING THE SUBREGION.

10. FOR PARIS: YOU WILL RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS SEPTTEL
REQUESTING THE GOF TO LEAVE EQUIPMENT IN RWANDA FOR USE BY
THE SENEGALESE CONTINGENT TO UNAMIR. PLEASE SHARE
CONTENTS OF THIS CABLE WITH THE GOF AND ASK THAT THEY MAKE
PARALLEL DEMARCHES.

11. BUJUMBURA - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. YY

PRETORIA IMMEDIATE
OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
KIEV IMMEDIATE
TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

Y

USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
BRAZZAVILLE
BANGUI
YAOUNDE
CANBERRA
WELLINGTON
PRAGUE
BRASILIA
BEIJING
TOKYO
LILONGWE
BAMAKO
LAGOS
SECDEF WASHDC

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